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Disclosure and Confidentiality Requirements of 
Corporate Pension Plan Actuaries 
Theodore Konshak* 
Abstract 
Corporate pension plan actuaries are subject to the standards of the Joint 
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries. The Joint Board is empowered to estab-
lish such standards under the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, a federal law. In consideration of these statutory stan-
dards, this article will discuss whether standards published by professional 
actuarial organizations have any applicability. The contrast between the dis-
closure requirements of federal law and the confidentiality standards of the 
Society of Actuaries will be highlighted. 
Key words and phrases: ERISA, actuarial standards, fiduciaries, enrolled actu-
ary, plan auditor 
Introduction 
Defined benefit pension plans promise to pay a monthly income to 
each participant for the remainder of the participant's lifetime or for 
the lifetimes of both the participant and his or her spouse. Money is 
deposited into a trust fund, is invested by the pension plan trustees, 
and is periodically withdrawn by the plan administrator to pay retirees 
their monthly benefits. In the United States, the minimum amount to be 
deposited into the trust fund is based on an annual actuarial valuation 
performed by an enrolled actuary under the terms of the 1974 Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
In addition to providing actuarial services under ERISA, actuarial 
service providers also can earn income by providing an employer with 
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a wide variety of services including, but not limited to, recordkeeping 
services for defined contribution pension plans and consulting services 
on the legal requirements of the pension plan. 
This paper reviews the required disclosures of the emolled actuary 
under ERISA and the confidentiality provisions of the Professional Code 
of Conduct of the Society of Actuaries to determine if the statutory 
standards of ERISA are being subverted, inadvertently or otherwise, by 
these professional standards. 
2 Enrolled Actuaries and Plan Auditors 
Corporate pension plans are classified into two general types based 
on whether the provisions of the plan define the deposits or the with-
drawals: 
• In a defined benefit plan, the plan provisions define a series of 
monthly withdrawals payable during the lifetime of the partici-
pant. The minimum deposit under federal law is determined by 
an actuarial valuation performed by an emolled actuary . 
• In a defined contribution plan, the plan provisions define the de-
posits than can and will be made. Withdrawals are these deposits 
and the investment earnings on these deposits. Defined contri-
bution plans do not require the services of an emolled actuary 
because the deposit is specified by the terms of the plan. 
A pension plan auditor examines the financial statements of the 
pension plan. In addition to determining whether the money is actu-
ally there, the pension plan auditor reviews the statement of where the 
money has gone. Both defined benefit and defined contribution pension 
plans with at least 100 participants require the services of an auditor. 
Under ERISA administrators of pension plans must engage both an 
emolled actuary and pension plan auditor on the behalf of all plan par-
ticipants. For emolled actuaries, this is the actual language of Section 
103(a)(4)(A) of ERISA. 
Engagement on the behalf of all plan participants is a legal require-
ment to ensure the impartiality of actuarial determinations and the in-
tegrity of pension plan audits. The accuracy of audited pension records 
should not reflect the effort an employer is willing to exert. The mini-
mum deposit required under federal law should not reflect the amount 
the employer currently is willing to contribute. Impartiality of actuar-
ial determinations and integrity of pension plan audits are duties and 
obligations of the emolled actuary and pension plan auditor. 
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The administrators of pension plans who hire the enrolled actuary 
and pension plan auditors are fiduciaries under Section 21 (A) of ERISA. 
This means plan administrators must discharge their duties solely in 
the interest of plan participants (Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA). Fiducia-
ries are the responsible parties and may be held legally liable for any 
misconduct. 
Enrolled actuaries are accredited and regulated by the joint Board 
for the Enrollment of Actuaries, a federal board consisting of three 
members appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and two members 
appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The joint Board is administered 
by an executive director appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Section 3042 of ERISA describes the enrollment of actuaries by the 
joint Board: 
The joint Board shall, by regulations, establish reasonable 
standards and qualifications for persons performing actuar-
ial services with respect to plans to which this Act applies 
and, upon application by any individual, shall enroll such in-
dividual if the joint Board finds that such individual satisfies 
such standards and qualifications ... The joint Board may, 
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, suspend or 
terminate the enrollment of an individual under this section 
if the joint Board finds that such individual-(l) has failed 
to discharge his duties under this Act, or (2) does not satisfy 
the requirements for enrollment as in effect at the time of 
his enrollment. 
The Standards of Performance for Enrolled Actuaries were published 
by the joint Board under Title 20, Chapter VIII, Part 901, Subpart C of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. 
The executive director of the joint Board maintains a roster of all 
persons whose enrollment to perform actuarial services under ERISA 
has been suspended or terminated. This roster contains the names of 
only two suspended enrolled actuaries. 
To date the joint Board has devoted most of its limited resources to 
the accreditation of enrolled actuaries through examinations and con-
tinuing education. Regulation of enrolled actuaries through its stan-
dards of performance has not been a priority. These statutory stan-
dards of performance may be expanded and be more strictly enforced 
if the composition of the joint Board is changed to include representa-
tives of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).l 
1 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is the federal agency that insures 
the payment of benefits from failed pension plans. As in other insolvency insurance 
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A representative of the PBGC presently can participate in discus-
sions of the Joint Board, but cannot vote on any issues. As the minutes 
of the March 15, 1995 meeting of the Joint Board indicate, the PBGC 
has attempted in the past to obtain voting representation on the Joint 
Board. Umeasonable actuarial determinations of the variable rate pre-
mium paid by corporate sponsors to the PBGC could intensify their 
efforts to obtain such representation. 
3 Actuarial Codes of Conduct 
3.1 Professional 
Actuarial organizations publish codes of professional conduct to 
govern the relationship between consulting actuary and client! employer. 
The professional codes of conduct of virtually every actuarial organiza-
tion in the United States are identical to the Code of the Society of Ac-
tuaries. Uniformity is necessary because the Actuarial Board for Coun-
seling and Discipline (ABCD) enforces these actuarial codes of conduct 
for the professional actuarial organizations sponsoring its activities. 
The following is from Precept 10 and Annotation 10-1, respectively, 
of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Society of Actuaries (1996)2: 
An actuary shall not disclose to another party any confiden-
tial information obtained through professional services per-
formed for a principal (Le., client or employer) unless autho-
rized to do so by the client or employer or required to do so 
by law. "Confidential information" refers to information not 
in the public domain of which the actuary becomes aware in 
conjunction with the rendering of professional services to a 
principal. It may include ... information which the actuary 
has reason to believe that the principal would not wish to be 
divulged. 
3.2 Criminal 
Under Title I, Section 103(d) of ERISA the results of the annual actu-
arial valuation are to be disclosed on an actuarial statement prepared by 
pools sponsored by the federal government (e.g., the FDIC for banks and the FSLIC for 
savings and loan associations), the PBGC is financed by premiums paid by the corporate 
sponsors of the defined benefit pension plans covered under the program. 
2 Society of Actuaries. 1996 Society of Actuaries Yearbook. Schaumburg, Ill.: Society 
of Actuaries, 1996. 
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the enrolled actuary (Le., the Schedule B prepared by the enrolled actu-
ary and attached to the annual Form 5500 filed by the plan administra-
tor). Section 103(d) of ERISA also requires the disclosure of information 
including, but not limited to, a statement of actuarial assumptions and 
methods used to determine costs and justifications for any change in 
those actuarial assumptions or methods. Section 103(d)(13) of ERISA 
requires disclosure of "such other information as may be necessary to 
fully and fairly disclose the actuarial position of the plan." 
Section 1027 of the Criminal Codes states: 
Whoever, in any document required by Title I of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (as amended 
from time to time) to be published, ... knowingly conceals, 
covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which 
is required by such title or is necessary to verify, explain, 
clarify, or check the accuracy and completeness any report 
required by such title to be published ... shall be fined not 
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both. 
ERISA created an enrolled actuary engaged on behalf of all plan par-
ticipants, imposed duties and obligations under ERISA on that enrolled 
actuary, and subjected him or her to the standards of the Joint Board for 
the Enrollment of Actuaries. Professional actuarial organizations also 
have standards governing the relationship between consulting actuary 
and client/employer. Confidentiality and full disclosure are examples 
of when the duties of the enrolled actuary are diametrically opposed to 
the standards of professional actuarial organizations. 
3.3 Contrast to Pension Plan Auditor 
Under the terms of Section 103(a)(3)(A) of ERISA the pension plan 
auditor examines the books and records of the pension plan under gen-
erally accepted auditing standards. In contrast, actuarial services are 
not performed under ERISA according to generally accepted actuarial 
standards. That term does not appear and would not have to appear 
in ERISA because the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries estab-
lishes the standards for enrolled actuaries. 
The statement preceding the enrolled actuary's signature on Sched-
ule B (Form 5500) makes no reference to generally accepted actuarial 
standards: 
To the best of my knowledge, the information supplied in 
this schedule and on the accompanying statements, if any, is 
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complete and accurate and, in my opinion, each assumption 
used in combination represents my best estimate of antici-
pated experience under the plan. Furthermore, in the case 
of a plan other than a multiemployer plan, each assump-
tion used is (a) reasonable (taking into account the experi-
ence of the plan and reasonable expectations) or (b) would, 
in the aggregate, result in a total contribution equivalent to 
that which would be determined if each such assumption 
were reasonable. In the case of a multiemployer plan, the 
assumptions used, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking 
into account the experience of the plan and reasonable ex-
pectations). 
Because actuarial determinations under ERISA are calculated accord-
ing to standards established by the JOint Board for the Enrollment of 
Actuaries and not according to the standards of the actuarial profes-
sion, enrolled actuaries have no legal basis for citing any actuarial stan-
dard under the Code of Professional Conduct of the Society of Actuar-
ies or any other actuarial organization. Auditing standards have legal 
recognition and standing under ERISA. The standards of professional 
actuarial organizations do not enjoy such recognition or standing. 
3.4 Consequences of Suspension 
One of the two suspended enrolled actuaries on the joint Board ros-
ter is currently a trustee of a major actuarial foundation. The other 
continues to be a consulting pension actuary with a major employee 
benefits consulting firm and was the discussion leader at a workshop 
on public employee retirement systems at an annual enrolled actuaries 
meeting.3 
At least in these two cases employment and status within the actu-
arial profession were not adversely impacted by suspension as an en-
rolled actuary. Legally the statutory standards of the joint Board take 
precedence. In practice, does the lack of detrimental consequences 
for suspension as an enrolled actuary suggest minimal respect for the 
statutory standards of the joint Board? 
3Under the separation of powers doctrine, pension plans sponsored by state and 
local governments (Le., public employee retirement plans) are exempted from the re-
quirements of ERISA, a federal law, and their actuaries therefore do not have to be 
enrolled by the Joint Board. 
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Table 1 
Changes in Actuarial Assumptions and Techniques 
Number of Changes 
Type of Change Actual Reported Justified 
Investment Return 8 5 2 
Retirement Ages 4 2 1 
Salary Increase 7 5 3 
Terminations of Employment 7 2 2 
Disabilities 2 1 0 
Deaths 7 3 2 
Payment of Plan Expenses 3 2 1 
Funding Method Changes 14 13 1 
Other 5 3 1 
Total 57 36 13 
4 Changes in Actuarial Assumptions & Techniques 
4.1 The Study 
Section 103(d) of ERISA and the instructions for completing Sched-
ule B require the enrolled actuary to attach a statement of actuarial 
assumptions and techniques, a statement of the changes in actuarial 
assumptions and techniques, and a statement justifying those changes 
in actuarial assumptions and techniques. In a study of a sample of 20 
pension plans that changed actuarial consulting firms, Konshak (1995)4 
tabulated the number of actual, reported, and justified changes. These 
results are reported in Table 1. The asset values of the pension plans 
sampled range from $207 million to $16 million. 
The actual changes in presented in Table 1 are obtained by compar-
ing the statement of actuarial assumptions and techniques attached 
to the 1993 Schedule B to the similar statement attached in the 1992 
Schedule B. Reported changes and justifications are tabulated from the 
1993 attachments to Schedule B. 
4Konshak, T. Financial Effect of Actuarial Marketing Practices on the Solvency of 
Corporate Pension Plans: First Annual Study. (A Research Report). Green Bay. Wis.: 
Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd., 1995. A copy of this study can be obtained by writing 
directly to the author. 
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According to the analysis of 1993 and 1992 Schedule B attachments 
there were 57 changes in actuarial assumptions and techniques re-
quired to be reported and justified. Thirty-six of these changes were 
reported by the enrolled actuary on the current Schedule B attachment. 
Only 13 of the reported changes (12 changes in actuarial assumptions 
and one change in actuarial techniques) were justified by the enrolled 
actuary. 
The practice of failing to disclose and justify changes in actuarial 
assumptions and techniques is either incompetence (enrolled actuaries 
certify to their familiarity with those portions of ERISA relating directly 
or indirectly to the responsibilities of an enrolled actuary on the Form 
5434-A application for their triennial renewal of enrollment) or a knowl-
edgeable concealment (corporate pension plan actuaries choose not to 
be governed by these provisions of ERISA). In any event, these individ-
uals have failed to discharge their duties under the terms of ERISA. 
4.2 An Example of a Justification 
Although most of the justifications for changes in actuarial assump-
tions and techniques are not immediately verifiable, one justification 
from the Konshak study will be analyzed for reasonableness. 
The assumed rate of future employment terminations was changed 
and justified by the enrolled actuary solely on the basis of prior plan 
experience: "The ultimate withdrawal rates were increased by a factor 
of 10 in order to better reflect actual plan experience." Enrolled actu-
aries who change actuarial assumptions and techniques in this study, 
however, normally would not have a personal and intimate knowledge 
of the prior plan experience. Pension plans in this example changed 
actuarial service providers. 
The prior experience of the pension plan can be established by study-
ing individual participant records if available from the prior enrolled ac-
tuary or corporate sponsor. Corporate sponsors, however, generally are 
unwilling to incur the substantial expense of performing such a study. 
The corporate sponsor in this case changed actuarial service providers 
to reduce its actuarial expenses and provided that as the reason for the 
change in enrolled actuary on the Schedule C (Form 5500) filed with 
the federal government: "Change due to receipt of more competitive 
bid from another actuary firm." 
The change in the assumed rate of future terminations of employ-
ment was the only change in actuarial assumptions or techniques made 
by the new enrolled actuary, and this assumption change significantly 
decreased the minimum deposit payable under federal law. The expla-
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nation for the change in enrolled actuary implies an experience study 
would not have been performed due to cost considerations and sug-
gests another reason for the change in withdrawal rates: cutting costs 
for the corporate sponsor. 
5 Resolution of Conflicting Values 
Pension actuaries believe they can balance their roles as consultants 
to the employer (subject to the standards of the Code of Professional 
Conduct) with their duties and obligations as enrolled actuaries (sub-
ject to the requirements of ERISA and the standards of the Joint Board). 
Technically, the previously quoted section of the Society of Actuaries' 
Code of Professional Conduct relating to confidentiality does not con-
flict with the statutory requirements of ERISA: "An actuary shall not dis-
close to another party any confidential information obtained through 
professional services ... unless ... required to do so by law." A written 
disclaimer in the Code, however, can not erase a sentiment to maintain 
confidentiality through superficial rather than full disclosure. 
The justification quoted in the previous section for the change in 
withdrawal rates could have been subjected to a peer review. If an expe-
rience study had been performed, a peer reviewer could have avoided 
the aforementioned challenge to the reasonableness of this justifica-
tion by suggesting its inclusion: "Based on the results of an experience 
study, the ultimate withdrawal rates were increased by a factor of 10 
in order to better reflect actual plan experience." None of the assump-
tion changes made by the other enrolled actuaries included in my study 
were justified in terms of an experience study. 
If an experience study had not been performed, a peer reviewer 
could make two criticisms. First, the rate of increase, "by a factor of 10," 
will draw the attention of the reader and should be eliminated. Second, 
even though the statement preceding the enrolled actuary's signature 
on the Schedule B necessitates consideration of both prior and expected 
experience by requiring reasonable assumptions "taking into account 
the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations," this assump-
tion change should have been justified solely in terms of the expected 
future experience of the plan. Drawing attention to the prior plan ex-
perience makes a regulatory request for data and a challenge based on 
that prior plan experience more likely. If the justification were changed 
according to these recommendations, it would be consistent with the 
justifications provided by the other enrolled actuaries reviewed by the 
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Konshak study: "The withdrawal rates were increased to better reflect 
the expected future experience of the plan." 
Of the 12 actuarial assumption changes justified by the enrolled 
actuaries included in the Konshak study, nine were justified solely on 
the basis of the expected future experience of the plan. Two of the 
assumption changes were justified both in the terms of the prior and 
the expected future experience of the plan (consistent with the enrolled 
actuary's statement on the Schedule B). Only the justification being an-
alyzed was justified solely in terms of prior plan experience. None of 
the enrolled actuaries supplied evidence or any specific information to 
support their assertions. 
By failing to introduce the uncertainty involved in predicting the fu-
ture experience of the plan, the justification analyzed in Section 4.2 
above lacks the vagueness of the other justifications reviewed by the 
Konshak study and therefore could be subjected to a challenge on its 
reasonableness. By maximizing vagueness and minimizing specifics, 
the other justifications reflect a sentiment to conceal under the confi-
dentiality provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct rather than a 
sentiment to disclose under the statutory requirements of ERISA. 
6 Conclusions 
The codes of conduct of professional actuarial organizations and 
their standards of actuarial practice are irrelevant for the enrolled ac-
tuary performing actuarial services under ERISA. Actuarial codes and 
standards can only confuse the issue and provide opportunities to sub-
vert, inadvertently or otherwise, the intent of statutory standards. Giv-
ing any credibility to the confidentiality provisions of any professional 
actuarial code would be irresponsible and contrary to the disclosure 
requirement of federal law. 
Enforcement from federal agencies is a reasonable and expected re-
sult for those pension actuaries who believe their professional codes of 
silence are above the law. This enforcement to date has been passive 
and lacking, but the Joint Board may actively search for enrolled actu-
aries failing to discharge their duties under ERISA when the PBGC has 
more influence with the Joint Board. 
